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PHILLIP BARRISH
The Secret Joys of Antiracist Pedagogy:
Huckleberry Finn in the Classroom
“Never say ‘nigger’ again. Never have I heard this word
spoken by a white person—or a black one, for that
matter—without feeling terribly angry and uncomfort-
able. Too much history and hostility are conjured up by
this word. . . . I don’t care how you use it. I don’t care
if you’re quoting some horrible white racist you ab-
hor—do not say it, and confront those white people who
do.”
—M. Garlinda Burton, Never Say Nigger Again!
“Before change is possible, that is, we need to recog-
nize how we get our enjoyment.”
—Dennis Foster, Sublime Enjoyment
This essay explores what I believe to be an unavoidable
paradox encountered by white liberal professors who set out to
practice antiracist pedagogy in mostly, but not entirely, white
classrooms. The paradox derives from the inevitability of the
professors’ (and, often, their students’) citing, and thus in a
sense performing, the blatantly racist past—most emblemati-
cally, the racist past compressed within the word “nigger”—
even while trying to move beyond its influence. This
performative citing of the past occurs within a purportedly
antiracist psychic and socioinstitutional “present,” but one that
retains its identity as antiracist by turning away from its own
dependence upon racial hierarchies and exclusions.
Among other aims, I hope here to offer a new purchase
on certain oft-recognized dilemmas involved in teaching Mark
Twain’s Adventures of Huckleberry Finn (1885), a brilliant and
seminal American novel in which the word “nigger” appears
over 200 times. To do so, I investigate several implications of a
rupture between the nonracist space usually presumed within
Huck Finn classrooms and the realities that both undergird and
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permeate that educational space. At moments, this break
comes perilously close to dissolving the presumed reasons for
being of a liberal arts classroom. I will suggest, however, that
the moments in which such a dissolution most immediately
impends—often when the word “nigger” is spoken by a white
person—can also produce an inarticulate, even unconscious
excitement, at least for the professor who is supposed to
guarantee the meaning and validity of the educational process.
Drawing on the Lacanian concept of jouissance, I argue that
this excitement is experienced by the psyche as overwhelming
and unmanageable. In the latter portions of this essay, I
analyze some of my own “symptomatic” experiences teaching
Huck Finn, as well as other evidence, to suggest that one way
this excitement can be channeled is through fantasied sce-
narios of domination and victimization.
Impossible Antiracism
I will begin exploring the paradoxical inevitability of white
liberal teachers’ citing the racist past even while trying to move
beyond it through a consideration of M. Garlinda Burton’s
Never Say Nigger Again! An Antiracism Guide for White Liberals
(1994). Burton, who is regional director of the United Meth-
odist News Service, identifies herself as an African-American
working in a very liberal but predominantly white environ-
ment. Characterizing her text as a “handbook, a question-and-
answer book, a guidebook,” Burton addresses an audience of
“white people who think they don’t need a book on racism”
(2). She offers many cogent insights about liberal white
racism, but I will focus here on her title as well as the genre of
her work.
First, how is Burton’s title, with its exclamation point, to
be understood? Should it be construed as an injunction?
“Never say nigger again!” Or should it, rather, be taken as a
promise of self-help? “Buy this book, follow its guided steps,
and you will never say nigger again—guaranteed!” The latter
reading would cast saying “nigger” as an unfortunate addiction
or compulsion, parallel to, say, overeating or falling in love
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with unsuitable partners. In this therapeutic paradigm, the
addictive practices in question may provide acute enjoyment in
response to a deeply felt need in the short term, but they can
never lead to satisfaction. Reading the title as a Franklinesque
promise of the self-improvement to be achieved if one has the
necessary discipline is supported not only by Burton’s descrip-
tion of the book as a “guide” but also by its bulleted and
numbered lists. These provide questions to ask oneself, do’s
and don’ts, and strategies for various social situations (how to
handle an older relative who uses racial slurs, for instance).
 On the other hand, the discursive passage inside the
book from which the title’s main phrase is drawn supports the
other possible interpretation—that is, as a strict Thou Shalt
Not commandment, which firmly, even angrily, underlines that
never means never, no matter what. The phrase appears, in
bolded type, as number four on a list of rules that Burton asks
white people to remember “When You’re Talking about Us”:
4 Never say “nigger” again. Never have I heard this word
spoken by a white person—or a black one, for that
matter—without feeling terribly angry and uncomfort-
able. Too much history and hostility are conjured up by
this word. . . . I don’t care how you use it. I don’t care if
you’re quoting some horrible white racist you abhor—do
not say it, and confront those white people who do. Say
“the n-word” or “a racial slur” if you have to; it may
sound silly or stilted, but you may save a relationship
with an African-American friend or colleague. If a black
friend says she doesn’t mind you saying it, she’s lying.
(33–34; italics in original)
Although it may seem to be an overly easy deconstructive
point, it is nonetheless worth noting the irony that Burton’s
very articulation of this rule entails breaking her own prohibi-
tion. Despite her insistence that no one, white or black, should
ever say “this word,” Burton’s book repeats it at least five times.
Indeed, “nigger” appears as the bolded heading of the
quoted paragraph, in the table of contents, on the title page,
on the back cover, and in a large, prominent typeface on the
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front cover. Any potential purchaser or reader must voice the
word to him- or herself when encountering the book. In
requesting it through Inter-Library Loan, I myself had to cite
the title on a form; and had I wanted to obtain the book
immediately, I would have had to call area bookstores, requir-
ing me to speak the forbidden word into the phone.
This double bind—one should never say the “n-word,” yet
articulating this “never” involves citing and reciting the word
both to oneself and to others—is more than an inconsequen-
tial language game. Like an evil incantation that always works,
no matter where, how, or by whom it is spoken, it performatively
“conjure[s] up” a “history and hostility” that are “too much,”
overwhelming any and all local contexts.1  Moreover, Burton
herself is sufficiently concerned about the citation paradox to
try to head it off when she italicizes “do not say it” even if
quoting “some horrible white racist” with abhorrence. Yet, as
we have seen, she finds it impossible not to repeat the word
herself, and her book’s very presence requires her target
audience to repeat it as well.2
Thus, the necessity of citing the word “nigger” inserts the
antiracist white speaker into an aporia, which toes the break-
ing point of a fundamental fracture.3  One is caught between
spaces (psychic as well as socio-institutional) that nurture a
notion of progress in American race relations and the perva-
sive and persistent realities that still inform and even help to
shape those same spaces. The liberal ideal of progress holds
that America’s racial problems are not yet (and may never be)
fully resolved, but they have historically improved and will
continue to do so, even if progress is always halting and
uneven. In this view, despite the continuing inequalities of the
1990s, race relations in that decade were much closer to
American ideals of democracy and justice than they were a
century earlier, when systemic lynchings, Jim Crow segrega-
tion, and myriad other forms of economic and political
oppression were directed against African-Americans.
I am not arguing against this balanced and commonsense
idea of progress, which I largely share. But I do maintain that
this idea must strive to exclude—even though it finds itself
constitutively unable to do so—certain psychic and material
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realities that threaten to deconstruct it. Moreover, to walk the
knife’s edge of this unresolvable tension can yield a vertiginous
enjoyment, or jouissance, to white liberals.
Jouissance and the Real
Although sometimes associated with sexual ecstasy, the
elusive Lacanian term jouissance has been suggestively expli-
cated by Joan Copjec (1994, 122–23) as “a pleasure in the
real.” In Lacanian theory, the “real” is by no means synony-
mous with “reality.” The “real” comprises that which cannot be
assimilated within—but also can never fully be denied or
excluded by—a given system of “reality,” a structured “symbolic
order.” Although the real cannot “fit” within our symbolic
(articulable) reality, neither does it have a free-standing exist-
ence outside of or beyond the order of reality. Rather, the
“real” marks the internal limit of a given system of reality and
prevents it from ever achieving full consistency and transpar-
ency.
As a “pleasure in the real,” jouissance does not connote the
joy of discovering or comprehending some aspect of reality.
Rather than marking knowledge or understanding, jouissance
for Copjec arises “precisely there where we do not know. . . .
Jouissance is a kind of ‘secondary gain’ obtained where knowl-
edge fails” (1994, 123). The intensity of jouissance is stimulated
when a not quite comprehensible or assimilable “real” and the
normal reality that we can comprehend and symbolize collide.
The sensation of jouissance at once registers that we have
reached an internal seam where language and understanding
fail, and compensates us for that failure. Dennis Foster (1997)
differentiates the “sublime enjoyment” of jouissance from gar-
den-variety pleasures: “I use the term to distinguish an experi-
ence of intensity, of a loss of ego control and boundaries
(which may be felt as horror or delight), from those ‘pleasures’
of satisfaction, of ego gratification” (161).
Two recent news events, one local to the University of
Texas at Austin (where I teach) and the other a story that
received national coverage, serve to illustrate my contention
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that within the symbolic reality of white liberalism the word
“nigger” often functions as the trigger for just the kind of
“intensity” that Foster describes. Together, these two events
suggest that within white liberal culture the word acts as a do-
not-touch button that nonetheless keeps getting pressed. Its
activation releases sensations of “horror or delight” due to a
loss of control and breaking of bounds. The jouissance pro-
voked by white liberal speakings of “nigger,” however, is quickly
repackaged by the media into a more readily consumable
masochistic scene of fantasied white male suffering.
“Diversity” Events
During the “diversity” portion of a new-employee orienta-
tion in 1999, the University of Texas’s white Director of
Housing and Food Services commented, “When I worked up
North, I heard ‘nigger’ as often or more than I do down here.”
An assistant later explained that her boss had used the word as
an “example.” Several offended employees, however, took the
word to have been uttered in retaliation against an African-
American cook whom, just moments before, the administrator
had noticed reading a newspaper while he was speaking. The
majority of lower-ranking housing and food-service workers at
the University are African-American or Latino. The adminis-
trator apologized the next day for any unintended offense
caused by his having spoken the word, emphasizing his per-
sonal and professional stand against racism as shown by a “10-
Point Organizational Diversity Plan” implemented under his
supervision. He conceded in somewhat frustrated disappoint-
ment that, in future, “I won’t be as strong with my message”
(Grisales 1999, 1A).
Barely a week before the above incident, the District of
Columbia’s African-American mayor made national headlines
by accepting the resignation under pressure of a white city
official who had used the word “niggardly” during a budget
discussion with a black aide. This white official, the director of
the Office of the Public Advocate, had very strong liberal
credentials and was the only openly gay person in the District
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administration. He was later rehired. Here, the incident did
not revolve around whether a racial slur had been spoken with
hostile intent, as at the University of Texas event. Instead, the
conflict was over whether a racial slur had been uttered at all.
As many commentators hastened to point out, the Old English
derivation of “niggardly” appears to be entirely separate from
the etymology of “nigger,” which goes back to the Latin “niger,”
or black. If the two words are unrelated both etymologically
and semantically, can the very sound of “niggardly” nonethe-
less function as a performative speaking of the racial slur?
It is impossible at this distance to judge what conscious or
unconscious intentions may have motivated the white aide’s
choice of words in Washington, just as we cannot be certain
whether the administrator in Austin intended his use of the
epithet “nigger” to serve antiracist or racist purposes. (Of
course, there is always the possibility that the administrator
“intended” both meanings at the same time, with one inten-
tion being more conscious than the other.) In both of these
incidents, however, a white speaker was at some level failing to
grasp that the liberal space in which he presumably thought he
was using a particular word was surrounded and permeated by
a “real” that rendered that space incoherent.
At the University of Texas’s “diversity” event, the white
administrator—by articulating his ten-point organizational plan,
by sponsoring the session at which he spoke, and perhaps even
by choosing the “example” that he did—was operating within a
commitment to keep moving forward on racial matters. Those
African-American listeners who were offended by his language
no doubt recognized these laudable intentions. Yet the listen-
ers also attended to another structure traversing, even prop-
ping up, this progressive framework—that is, the historically
familiar scene of a white boss disciplining workers of color
(here an African-American male for reading, no less).4  The
administrator’s utterance of “nigger” marked the moment at
which the listeners became unable or unwilling any longer to
cooperate in overlooking the disjunction between the official
context and the event’s “real” racial structure.
This “real” ensured that, at least from one vantage point,
the word performatively “meant” racist insult. One might
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think that the administrator should have been more aware of
the asymmetries of power that complicated (to say the least)
his intentions to symbolize and enact the Division of Housing
and Food Service’s opposition to racism. Yet no matter how
hard he tried, it was not possible for this speaker fully to take
the permeating racial real into account—to fit its constraints
successfully into his liberal vision of how we must all work
together to overcome the evil of racism.
The incidents at the University of Texas and in the District
of Columbia together underscore the almost uncanny
inescapability in white liberal discourse of the word “nigger”
and all that it conjures up. In a further definition of the “real,”
Foster (1997) says that it “names some stain, an obscurity in
every representation. . . . It is what can be neither understood
nor ignored and therefore is never a source of satisfaction”
(12). America’s continuing history of racist violence and
injustice constitutes an ever-present real (see Spillers 1997;
Lane 1998a). At unpredictable moments, this real will “stain,”
clog, or implode liberal representation in ways that do not
yield the “satisfaction” of understanding, let alone resolution.
But did the speakers in either of these incidents derive
jouissance—a “surplus of enjoyment”—from uttering the words
that revealed an incoherence in the positions from which they
spoke? Who can say? Rather than speculate about private
sensations, I think it is more instructive to ponder the national
press response to the forced resignation of David Howard, the
D.C. official. This will enable us to elucidate the social and
psychological dynamics at play in texts by several commenta-
tors who took avowedly “antiracist” positions on the eruption
that stained the liberal space inside Howard’s office.
Howard reportedly said, “I will have to be niggardly with
this fund because it’s not going to be a lot of money,” during a
budgeting dispute with an African-American aide. The latter
heard him as having said “nigger” and angrily left the meeting.
After the aide complained to Mayor Anthony Williams, Will-
iams met with Howard and accepted his resignation. Several
days later, Howard was rehired. Many journalists and public
figures disagreed with the mayor’s initial termination of
Howard’s employment. (“Seems to me the mayor has been
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niggardly in his judgment on this issue,” then NAACP chair
Julian Bond wryly told the Associated Press.) By contrast,
others concurred with Howard himself, who admitted that he
had “used poor judgment in using that word” and who told the
Washington Post that he hoped his own mistake would serve as
“a signal flag to all of us” (Weeks 1999, C1). But I have not
come upon even one mainstream editorial page that echoes
Howard’s own assessment. On the contrary, most editorials
and columnists blame the black mayor for having accepted
Howard’s resignation.
Interestingly, outrage has been expressed (Parker 1999)
not only on behalf of David Howard but on behalf of the word
“niggardly” itself, which has a “long-honored” history of usage
by canonical British writers from Shakespeare to Dickens. The
editors of the Boston Globe, for example, found it “sad to think
that a brave word could die from disuse because of ignorance
compounded by hair-trigger sensitivities” (Editorial 1999b,
A18) In a syndicated column from the same paper, conserva-
tive libertarian white columnist Jeff Jacoby saw the need to
defend both Howard and the “venerable English word” against
“other people’s ignorance of English” (1999, A15). For Jacoby,
Howard had been “thrown to the wolves.” Reporting that one
of Howard’s “black friends” had described him to the Washing-
ton Post as “the most gentle, purest guy you’d ever want to
meet,” Jacoby emphasized that “the victims of mindless racial
resentment so often are.” In his final paragraph, Jacoby
admonished his readers that “people everywhere are laughing
about this incident. But at the heart of it is the trashing of a
decent man, and there’s nothing funny about his pain.”
The racist and colonialist fantasy into which Jacoby inserts
the District of Columbia incident is not difficult to recognize.
The “purest” white “gentle” man and the “venerable English”
language have both been mindlessly attacked by dark-skinned
“wolves” aligned with “ignorance” and, as Jacoby adds, “idiocy.”
An editorial in the Atlanta Constitution summons the same
imagery of a bestial attack when it says that those responsible
for Howard’s resignation were engaged in “a peculiar and
predatory form of race-baiting” (Editorial 1999a). Jacoby him-
self identifies with the “victim.” Immediately prior to bringing
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forward Howard’s black friend as a character witness on his
behalf, Jacoby recounts a time when he was himself
“denounce[d] as a racist” because he revealed that “the Jacoby
family cat” is named Jemima (“—because the cat is named
Jemima,” he repeats in exaggerated disbelief).
The Jouissance of White Male Victimhood
Jacoby’s vision of the D.C. event—the essentials of which
are shared (albeit in less vivid language) by several other
newspaper columns and editorials (Editorial 1999c; Feagler
1999; Neuharth 1999)—demeans the offended African-Ameri-
can listener as both subhuman and murderously dangerous.
(The S.A.T. strikes again: David Howard told a New York Times
reporter that he learned the word “niggardly” as a junior in
high school when preparing for the exam.) Yet interwoven
with racist aggressivity, a powerful masochistic impulse also
animates Jacoby’s vision of the event. His column moves with
increasing fervor towards the “pain” that is its last word and in
which Jacoby himself, identifying with the wounded Howard,
seems to luxuriate. Moreover, the public humiliation involved
in “trashing” a decent man is amplified by a large circle of
imagined laughing spectators.
In Taking It Like a Man: White Masculinity, Masochism, and
Contemporary American Culture, David Savran (1998) has traced
the postwar “ascendancy of a new and powerful figure in U.S.
culture: the white male as victim” (4). Savran’s analysis ranges
from hipsters of the 1950s to far-right militias of the 1990s.
Prominent throughout this terrain, Savran demonstrates, are
“masochistic fantasies” of white masculinity. These fantasies
have arisen, he argues, largely in response to relatively modest
economic and political advances achieved by white women and
minorities since World War II and to the decline since the
1970s in the real wages of working-class and lower middle-class
white men. For Savran, white men who imagine themselves as
suffering victims ultimately do so as part of a strategy by which
they seek to retain their “cultural hegemony” and their “enor-
mous economic, political, and social power” (37).
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Savran’s description of white-male-as-victim fantasies pro-
vides an explanatory context for the mainstream reactions to
Howard’s losing his job for having said “niggardly.” To defend
the “venerable” English language against the “ignorance” of
racial others is also to defend a cultural hegemony. To empha-
size the tragedy of Howard’s resignation and, moreover, to
position the D.C. mayor as the stupidly culpable agent is
implicitly to undercut African-Americans who supervise white
professionals. Yet what about the perverse pleasure of masoch-
ism? Is it connected to jouissance? Do the scenarios of white
male pain provoked by the D.C. event derive their energy from
the overwhelming excitement that, as I have argued, can arise
in the disjunction between liberal reality and an underlying
racist real?
When recalling his own experience as a “decent man”
victimized by “mindless” charges of racism, Jacoby mentions
that the name of his cat, for which he was attacked as a racist,
came up in a column that he wrote criticizing the motor voter
law. Trying to show the potential for abuse in a system that
allows people to register to vote when renewing their driver’s
licenses, Jacoby claimed that he had succeeded in registering
his cat Jemima as a voter in three states. Angry readers, Jacoby
relates in a tone of injured innocence, “called and wrote to
denounce me as a racist—because the cat is named Jemima.”
Although Jacoby does not say so, the motor voter law
aimed to make voter registration more accessible to working-
class and especially minority citizens. So Jacoby’s attempt to
ridicule this law was also an indirect attack on an attempt to
increase African-Americans’ access to the franchise. The “real”
structure of Jacoby’s registering “Jemima” to vote included the
racial dynamics of the debate about the motor voter law. It also
included the history, going back to Reconstruction, of the
deployment of scorn and demeaning animal imagery against
African-Americans’ civic aspirations. (See, for example, The
Birth of a Nation.) Now, whatever conscious awareness Jacoby
may have had about the real context in which he first disclosed
his cat’s name (and in this case I suspect a relatively high
degree of consciousness), that context could not be acknowl-
edged in a column bemoaning the fate of a “pure” white man,
128 Huckleberry Finn in the Classroom
whether David Howard or Jacoby himself, trashed by mindless
resentment.
Jacoby’s column is thus necessarily fractured between its
representations of white male innocence and its participation
in a continuing history of white racist disenfranchisement of
African-Americans. The friction between these two aspects of
the column—between its would-be “symbolic” meanings and
its unacknowledged “real”—generates an explosive charge or
jouissance that is, I suggest, displaced into the masochistic
fantasy of white male “pain” with which Jacoby concludes.
Fantasies of pain and humiliation can be disturbing. But as
scenes that are freestanding and coherent, and possess the
virtue of psychic familiarity, they are easier to manage than the
more traumatic dissolutions adumbrated by jouissance.5
Huck Finn and the Antiracist Teacher’s Enjoyment
An ever-growing body of secondary literature focuses on
the pedagogical challenges posed by the more than 200
appearances of the word “nigger” in Adventures of Huckleberry
Finn. Mark Twain’s novel “is generally acknowledged as the
literary work most frequently taught in U.S. colleges and high
schools,” but struggles continue over how best to deal with the
racial epithet that appears on almost every page (Leonard
1999, 1). In contrast to the aversion evinced by some students,
parents, and secondary-school teachers, the currently domi-
nant approach to the problem among literary scholars is to
treat the word as an especially loaded focal point for a more
general question about Twain’s text: “Does Huckleberry Finn
Combat or Reinforce Racist Attitudes?” (see Graff and Phelan
1995). However, this seemingly even-handed question is some-
thing of a set-up, since the great majority of critics will answer
that, taken as a whole, Huck Finn does indeed “combat racist
attitudes.” Those who argue that Twain’s novel serves primarily
to “reinforce racist attitudes” are far fewer and tend not to
consider themselves primarily as academics (see Smiley 1996;
Lester 1992; Wallace 1992).
Many scholars (Smith 1992; Kaplan 1995; Fishkin 1993,
1996) go so far as to view Twain’s novel as an unambiguous
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and uniquely powerful indictment of a racist culture. They see
Twain’s use of “nigger” as always occurring, in effect, within
ironic quotation marks. They argue that he revels in the word
not merely out of historical verisimilitude but because he
wishes to undercut or hollow out late-nineteenth-century ste-
reotypes. The task of the teacher of Huckleberry Finn then
becomes to help students recognize the implicit quotation
marks around the offensive word and to understand the
subversive work that they perform. As Jonathan Arac (1997)
has pointed out, however, there is no guarantee that readers
will “get” Twain’s supposed irony (33). Nor is there any
certainty that the appearances of “nigger” in the text will, or
even should, be taken as synecdoches for Twain’s larger “mes-
sage” regarding race and racism.
Arac traces the fascinating process by which Adventures of
Huckleberry Finn achieved “hypercanonicity” in the contexts of
the Cold War and the Civil Rights movement. In the 1950s and
’60s, Twain’s novel came to be revered as the literary expression
of America’s democratic spirit both in the academy and in
liberal culture generally. From the 1950s on, Arac shows, Huck
Finn has been vigorously defended by scholars and editorialists
alike against any charges that it might function to support
racism or racist values, in the classroom or anywhere else.
Among other effects of Huck Finn’s hypercanonization,
Arac (1997) believes that the widespread “idolatry” of the book
“has served, and—remarkably—continues to serve, as an ex-
cuse for well-meaning white people to use the term nigger with
the good conscience that comes from believing that their
usage is sanctioned by their idol . . . and is made safe by the
technique of irony” (16). Thus, “even though Huckleberry Finn
is claimed as a talisman of racially progressive thought and
action, one of its major effects is actually to license and
authorize the continued honored circulation of a term that is
both explosive and degrading” (28). Arac documents, for
example, how many writers have praised the humanity Twain
gives to “Nigger Jim” despite the fact that this offensive
sobriquet nowhere appears in the novel itself (24–28).
As a teacher, I hope that my own approach to the novel
has stopped short of idolatry. But when it comes to the word
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“nigger” I have tended to resort to the Twain-uses-it-in-ironic-
quotation-marks approach. I have drawn students’ attention,
for instance, to the famous moment in Chapter 32 when, in
response to Huck’s fib about a steamboat and an explosion,
Aunt Sally Phelps asks him if anybody was hurt and he answers,
“No’m. Killed a nigger.” Here, it is relatively easy to argue that
Huck’s literally dehumanizing use of the word is part of his
clever attempt to play into Aunt Sally’s assumptions about an
expected visitor (whom Huck is pretending to be). Especially
because of its slightly overdone neatness —Huck’s response
can be felt as a punch line in patter that continues with Aunt
Sally’s saying, “well, it’s lucky; because sometimes people do
get hurt”—it makes sense to see the moment as showing
Huck’s canny reading of Aunt Sally’s likely prejudices, and
thus to read his use of the epithet under the sign of irony.
I have not given up raising pedagogical questions about
how “nigger” may function ironically in Twain’s novel. After
1996, however, when Hopwood v. Texas eliminated affirmative
action at the University of Texas, teaching Huck Finn in my very
largely white American literature classes has become increas-
ingly fraught for me. Since Hopwood, I have tried to devote a
full class session to having a “metadiscussion” about the word
“nigger.” Because I often focus on close textual analysis, I
regularly find myself reading the word aloud or asking a
student to do so. In addition, the word will sometimes be used
in paraphrases of or references to Twain’s text, usually by
students, but occasionally by me. In such cases, even when we
don’t twitch our fingers in the air, our unspoken presumption
is that the word is being spoken with extra implicit quotation
marks around it to show that it is being cited from the text or
from “back then,” rather than emanating from ourselves.
During our “metadiscussions,” I ask my students to consider
how the word operates in Twain’s book as well as in its socio-
linguistic contexts both during the 1840s (when the book is
set) and during the 1880s (when it was written). In addition,
however, I want them to reflect on what actually happens when
“we” sound and re-sound “nigger” at the turn of the twenty-first
century.
The University of Texas lost the Hopwood case on appeal to
a panel of the Fifth Circuit Court, a ruling that has so far
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withstood all attempts at further review. Losing the case meant
that public universities in Texas had to cease the practice of
affirmative action in admissions, financial aid, and hiring.6
One especially controversial aspect of the Fifth Circuit panel’s
ruling was its disregard of Supreme Court precedent with
respect to the “diversity” rationale for affirmative action. As
articulated by Justice Lewis Powell in Bakke v. California (1978),
the diversity rationale holds that the educational benefits
provided for all students by the presence of a racially and
culturally diverse student body can legally justify giving race
some weight in the admissions process. Dissenting justices on
the Fifth Circuit characterized the majority’s disregard of
Justice Powell’s “diversity” opinion as an “unprecedented and,
we suggest, impertinent step,” but as of this writing it still
stands.7
After the 1996 Hopwood decision, the importance and
meaning of having a “diverse” student body were much de-
bated on campus, as was the question of what role racial
discrimination still played at the University. In this context, my
highlighting of the need to perform the word “nigger” when
analyzing Huck Finn had an ulterior aim. I hoped to provide a
concrete demonstration of the importance of diversity in
college education by leading my white students to note and
reflect upon the classroom’s pervasive hue and how this might
limit the reach of our discussion both of Twain’s novel and of
its contemporary relevance. I hoped to foster an experience-
based insight about how a lack of diversity could impede their
own learning and growth. As for those few students of color
who might be in the class, beyond hoping that they wouldn’t
be offended I found myself unable to think coherently about
what educational value, if any, they might derive from this
discussion. In fact, since my “lesson” paradoxically relied upon
deemphasizing the presence of nonwhite students in the
classroom—of which I was nonetheless acutely aware—I was
certainly guilty of reducing the problem of racism to the
question of what white people think or feel.8
I have just presented this scene of antiracist pedagogy with
rational, intellectualized detachment. However, when I am
leading my classes in analytic discussions of the word “nigger”
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my physical and emotional temperature is hot, not cold. I feel
my face getting heated and often intensely wish that I could
transport myself elsewhere. I squirm at my white students’
foolish or “inappropriate” remarks, including: “the word is
only used for a joke these days”; “black people use it among
themselves all the time”; “my grandparents still use that word
but they don’t know any better.” I sweat under my arms as I try
to counter that the word continues to possess demeaning
implications. Why am I, the ostensibly liberal and conscien-
tious teacher, in such a state?
It is easy to identify where at least some of my awkwardness
and embarrassment come from. In the first place, who am I to
speak about this topic? Secondly, since many of the white
students assume that racism lies safely in the past and plays no
role in their own lives and minds, how do I challenge their
remarks that appear almost transparently racist—or at least
blind to their own race privilege—without seeming to claim a
holier-than-thou status? Thirdly, and most uncomfortably of
all, if there are African-American students in the room, who
may or may not be contributing to the class discussion, what
are they thinking and feeling? Have I made a horrible mistake
in forcing them to sit through this? Do they feel ambushed, as
if now they “should” say something on a topic that they may
have no desire to discuss in this context? Have I made these
students angry at me or ensured that they will be more than
usually self-conscious about coming to my class for the next
several weeks?
To me these sessions always feel stressful and frustrating,
sometimes almost unbearably so. But I also experience them as
uniquely intense. They twist my viscera and sensitize the
surface of my skin. I leave with churning feelings, mostly of
guilt, confusion, and shame, as well as a sort of depressive
helplessness. It is a dictum of Freudian thought, however, that
where there is guilt there is also unconscious desire. What does
it mean that I feel as if I’ve been caught red-handed in some
shameful act every time I embark on a pedagogical attempt to
discuss the word “nigger”? What secret desire might underlie
the guilt? It goes beyond, I think, excitement at breaking a
taboo, at the repeating out loud of a forbidden word (which,
of course, I know quite well before class that I will do).
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What strikes me now, as I look back over the pattern I have
described, is that for all the care and planning that goes into
these sessions, when I walk out of my classroom, exhausted,
I’m overwhelmed by one question: What was I just doing in
there? I have not, it is clear, had the teacher’s gratifying
experience of achieving knowledge and understanding regard-
ing some aspect of reality with my students. As Copjec puts it,
jouissance arises “precisely there where we do not know” (1994,
123) Part of my acute discomfort when discussing the word
“nigger,” I suspect, comes from the sensation of a collision
between my own symbolic position as liberal professor and the
racial real of my university, my classroom, and my own psyche.
Regarding the Lacanian concept of the “real,” Foster
observes that what operates as the internal blockage or limit
for a given reality is not “general or universal . . . the same
everywhere for all people.” Every structured reality will have its
own “real,” which depends on the “particular qualities in the
forms of symbolic representation at work for a given subject”
(1997, 12). For the symbolic system that governs my avowedly
antiracist classroom at a prestigious and predominantly white
state university—a university recently forced by a federal court
to discontinue affirmative action— the inassimilable real be-
gins with the crazy persistence of racial exclusion. This persis-
tence, which is visible as soon as one becomes conscious of the
overwhelming whiteness in the room but remains invisible as
long as whiteness continues to be taken for granted or un-
marked, can be called “crazy” because, as Nathan Glazer
(1997) has trenchantly commented, it simply doesn’t make
sense some thirty-five years after the Civil Rights movement is
supposed to have changed America.
Indeed, the Fifth Circuit Court’s ruling in Hopwood cat-
egorically denied that affirmative action was still necessary to
compensate for the University of Texas’s admitted history of
racial discrimination. Since the late 1960s, the Court empha-
sized, the University has officially welcomed diversity and has,
moreover, devoted resources, including “a significant amount
of scholarship money,” to minority recruitment and retention
programs. The Court noted that “the vast majority of the
faculty, staff, and students at the law school had absolutely
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nothing to do with any discrimination that the law school
practiced in the past.”9  Given the University’s long-running
efforts to make up for past racism, and that it is now peopled
almost entirely by those who had nothing to do with past
practices of segregation, most of whom regard those practices
with revulsion and anger, the court demanded, how could it
make sense to depict the University of Texas as an institution
that participates in or perpetuates racism? Yet one has only to
open one’s eyes (and look, for instance, at the staff from the
highest-ranking administrators to the custodial workers) to see
that a real of racist hierarchy and exclusion still persists.
Uttering the word “nigger” in my liberal, almost entirely
white classroom cannot help but engage this real, from which,
moreover, everyone in the dominant group continues to
profit. Within what Foster calls the particular “forms of sym-
bolic representation at work for a given subject,” I would
specify the inassimilable real further as the unwillingness—or
the inability—of most white people in the room, including
myself, fully to recognize and to imagine surrendering that
unfair profit.10
Moreover, if, as M. Garlinda Burton argues, the word
“nigger” inevitably conjures up the violent history of white
supremacy grounded in the degradation of black people, then
speaking the word in a class inevitably causes that history to
collide with the liberal (arts) tenets ostensibly underlying our
discussion. We operate under the assumption that all voices
deserve to be heard, that our class discussions should be
governed by fairness, rationality, and mutual respect.11  Yet the
history of white supremacy has helped in multiple ways to
shape my own and other universities. The University of Texas
was founded in 1883, during the post-Reconstruction heyday
of white racism. This was also the year that Twain finished
writing Huckleberry Finn, with its racially charged language.
Several statues commemorating the Lost Cause of the Confed-
eracy, which date from that same post-Reconstruction period,
remain on campus.12
It might seem relatively easy to separate the University of
Texas at Austin’s objectionable and obviously dated statues and
building names from its mission, which defines itself in rela-
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tion to the Enlightenment values of reason, truth, fairness,
neutral expertise, civilization, service, and progress. And it
might seem the merest common sense to claim that the racism
of many of the University’s founders does not intrude into the
practices of my own classroom. After all, the goal of my
teaching is to empower students and to improve society
through offering guidance in the tools and protocols of critical
thought. Yet it has been a key insight of recent work in critical
race theory that these Enlightenment ideals emerged from,
and have historically been interpreted within, contexts that
also accepted white supremacy as common sense. Might not
such ideals be, as Gary Peller (1995) puts it, “a manifestation
of group power, of politics?” (133). Regarding American
higher education, Peller asks whether “myriad features of the
day-to-day aspects of institutional life constructed or main-
tained during segregation might have reflected deeper aspects
of a culture within which the explicit exclusion of blacks
seemed uncontroversial?”
As I have argued, an encounter with the disjunction
between one’s own organizing “reality” and a pervading racist
“real” yields a hot charge, not unlike putting one’s finger into
wires that one thought were “dead” and experiencing an
electric shock. Regarding media responses to the D.C. inci-
dent, I suggested that one place this charge might go is into
sadomasochistic fantasies organized around having or not
having power. The almost rhythmic incantations of “nigger”
during discussions of Twain’s novel likewise evoke a sadomas-
ochistic scenario, at least for me as a teacher. To adapt Freud’s
famous phrase, “a child is being beaten,” the syntax of which
allows for mobile fantasied identifications with the positions of
victim, abuser, and observer, “a word is being said,” and said,
and said again, whenever Huck Finn is taught.
But if sadomasochism does come into play here, what are
its specific vectors? As a Jewish New Yorker, I probably take
some pleasure in being able to view my Caucasian Christian
students (than whom I sometimes feel more marked or less
“white”) in the humiliating position of discovering themselves
to be more discursively naive, more crudely provincial than I
am. They don’t know enough not to toss off remarks such as
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“black people use it among themselves all the time” or “the
word is only used for a joke these days.” As for any black
students in the class, my guilt tells me that I must be enjoying
something of the voyeur’s sadism, especially if they remain
silent. Throughout the discussion I glance covertly in their
direction. I enjoy the voyeur’s sense of safety because, ulti-
mately, I feel that the word “nigger,” no matter how many times
it is said, can never really touch or hurt me: I am white.
Apparently at odds with the sensation of invulnerability
just mentioned, however, I think that there is also a masochis-
tic (and narcissistic) sense of myself as a noble victim. I take
pride in sacrificing pedagogical safety and comfort by taking
the risk of staging such discussions, in being oppressed by
anxiety about my students’ feelings, and even in the humilia-
tion of my self-exposure. There is at least a frisson, moreover,
both in feeling myself “forced” to repeat the “n-word” and in
listening to my students recite it back to me in turn. But the
masochism here is, by definition, light. These discomforts
leave no welts. The one day each term devoted to discussing
the word becomes, at least for me, a session of stinging, but
finally limited and controlled, encounters with the real.
I recognize that the present essay may seem to promote
skepticism about liberal white antiracist pedagogy, at least as
practiced within privileged educational contexts. Put most
pessimistically: if such pedagogy does not go beyond bumping
repeatedly against the racist real that continues to subtend the
place of its own enunciation, then what’s the point? Nonethe-
less, I hope that by gaining a better understanding of how I
“get my enjoyment” I will be able to develop renewed and, yes,
recharged possibilities for participation in social change. Above







1. For alternative perspectives on citations of this word, see Naylor (1995), who
addresses its use by African-Americans, and most recently the important book by
Randall Kennedy (2002), who argues that “to condemn whites who use the N-
word without regard to context is simply to make a fetish of nigger” (51). Among
the examples he adduces of whites who use the word even as they perform not
only nonracist but antiracist actions is Lyndon Johnson’s referring to Thurgood
Marshall as a “nigger” when nominating him as the first African-American to
serve on the Supreme Court. Rather than attempting to determine whether a
given use of the n-word should or should not be considered “wrong” from a
progressive standpoint, however, I wish to investigate moments in which even
unintentional enunciations can force two contradictory contexts into simulta-
neous visibility.
2. As Judith Butler (1997) analogously observes, “The critical and legal discourse
on hate speech is itself a restaging of the performance of hate speech” (7).
3. Even if one were to make a point of religiously substituting “the n-word,” this
break into what Burton terms “stilted” speech would call attention to the
occluded word as a material object. The 1992 Bush campaign’s introduction of
the “L-word” as an all-purpose label for what the Republicans opposed was a
technique not for erasing the word “liberal” from voters’ consciousnesses, but
rather for foregrounding it in a subliminal fashion. Given the semantic association
between the “L-word” and “n-word,” moreover, it does not seem to be accidental
that the same 1992 Bush campaign sought to indict Michael Dukakis as soft on
crime by using the notorious Willie Horton commercials.
4. A generally unremarked dimension of the space defining the D.C. event is
likewise the fact that the District of Columbia, whose residents are mostly black,
remains the only area within the continental United States without a voting
representative in Congress.
5. Z˘iz˘ek (1998) calls jouissance “traumatic” because it is “structurally inassimilable
into [the subject’s] symbolic universe” (154).
6. The “ten-percent law,” passed by the legislature in response to Hopwood,
guarantees admission to the University of Texas for students graduating in the
top ten percent of the state’s high schools. Combined with increased recruit-
ment efforts, the law has managed to restore the number of minorities
matriculating to the University’s undergraduate colleges to pre-1996 levels.
(This number is, however, still significantly below the percentage of minorities
in the state.) The enrollment of African-Americans in professional and graduate
schools remains lower than it was before Hopwood. For complex reasons, the
population of English majors is far less diverse than that of the University as a
whole. Ironically, even the moderate success of the ten-percent law in improving
racial and ethnic diversity in public colleges is tacitly predicated on the
continuing de facto segregation of many Texas high schools.
7. “Dissent from failure to grant hearing en banc,” cited from http://
www.utexas.edu/hopwood/index.html. Within the next year or so, the “diver-
sity rationale” of affirmative action will probably be addressed by the United
States Supreme Court when it considers appeals of two lawsuits involving
admissions at the University of Michigan.
8. For descriptions by Afro-Americans of what it felt like for them (or their
children) to study or teach Huck Finn in predominately white classes, see Mensh
and Mensh (2000).
9. Hopwood v. State of Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir). March 18, 1996: “Opinion
Reversing and Remanding,” cited from http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/
pub/94/94-50569-cv0.htm
10. For a superb account of the “profit” in whiteness, see Lipsitz (1998). Wiegman’s
(1998) examination of “the hegemony of liberal whiteness” and its fantasy of a
“postsegregationist antiracist white subject” dissects how attempts by white
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academics and activists (for example, those involved in the magazine Race
Traitor) to dismantle whiteness as a form of racial privilege inevitably founder
on the unacknowledged “impossibility of white antiracism” (147).
11. For a forceful critique of these assumptions in the context of composition
classes, see Jarratt (1991). Also useful in a pedagogical connection is Fox
(2001).
12. For a discussion of seemingly “dated” monuments in locales ranging from
Austin to Moscow, see Levinson (1998).
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